Abstract Racial discrimination appears to contribute significantly to the observed discrepancy in incarceration rates for whites and African Americans. Between 1976 and 1999, 12 states passed laws requiring that lists of eligible jurors for state trials be created by selecting at random from publicly available sources, limiting the discretion of jury commissioners to exclude African Americans from jury service. A differencein-difference analysis suggests these reforms led to a 5 to 6 percentage point drop in the share of new admissions to prison accounted for by African Americans and other minorities, and lower rates of exercise of the death penalty overall. *
Introduction
African Americans comprised 46 percent of the prison population in the United States in 2000, while accounting for only 12 percent of the total population (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000; United States Census Bureau, 2000) .
Part of this disproportionate rate of incarceration may reflect differences in crime rates, types of crime committed and arrest rates. However, in addition, it is commonly believed that racial discrimination in the judicial system contributes significantly to observed discrepancies in incarceration rates for whites and African Americans (Anwar et al, 2012; Cole, 2000; Kennedy, 1998; Western and Pettit, 2009) . Most observers would agree that some form of discrimination on the basis of race occurs in the criminal justice system, but would be uncertain about the extent to which discriminatory behavior accounts for a quantitatively significant portion of this disparity in incarceration rates and the widely acknowledged differences in economic outcomes associated with it. This analysis takes a step towards understanding the extent to which diverse participation in juries, and more broadly in political, legal and economic institutions, affects real outcomes, assessing the magnitude of the contribution of racial biases to significantly disparate aggregate patterns in incarceration by race by evaluating the effects of a set of civil rights-related reforms on defendants in cases originating in lower courts.
While discriminatory actions on the part of a number of actors in the judicial system, including judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, may contribute to the observed disparities in outcomes, this discussion focuses on the role of trial jurors in criminal cases.
1 This article carefully estimates the potential contribution of racial biases to aggregate differences in incarceration rates using a difference-in-difference approach based on changes in state law and regulation regarding the determination of eligible jurors.
Racially biased decisions in criminal justice and adjudication have attracted considerable attention from both researchers and popular media, both in understanding apparently biased patterns in incarceration by race, and especially in the context of capital trials, with in particular, implications for the debate over the justifiability of the death penalty, given strong differences in its application by race (Katz et al., 2003; Donohue and Wolfers, 2005; Blume et al., 2004; Arvanites and Asher, 1998; Tonry, 1995) ; and have also generated interest among researchers interested in small-group decisionmaking in economics and other disciplines, with the goal of understanding how the composition and institutional structures that shape deliberation in criminal and civil juries, admissions committees, governing bodies, and corporate boards influence the distributional equity, accuracy and perceived fairness of the outcomes of negotiation, with implications for discrimination across a broad set of social interactions (Goeree and Yariv, 2010) .
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This paper assesses the role of procedural reforms accompanying broader non-discrimination mandates in addressing racially discriminatory practices in courts and criminal adjudication, relying on a series of changes in state laws governing the compilation of lists of eligible jurors to attempt to identify the impact of efforts to increase participation of African Americans and other minorities in jury service on the racial composition of admissions to prison, finding evidence for strong effects of race on rates of new admissions to prison, with these policy changes potentially accounting for up to one quarter of the racial gap in incarceration.
The estimates presented in this paper capture the effect of one set of reforms, and could arguably be viewed as a lower bound on the extent to which racial discrimination contributed to the observed racial incarceration gap during this period; which despite witnessing increasing enforcement of legal mandates for equal treatment in education and in the workplace and related improvements in many measures of racial progress, appears to have witnessed an increase in overall incarceration rates among African Americans (Wolfers and Stevenson, 2010; Western and Pettit, 2009 ). This time trend may reflect broad changes in law enforcement, changes in the incentives for crime, or attempts to weaken nondiscrimination requirements by passing conflicting legislation and using other characteristics as a proxy for race, evoking the discriminatory provisions of state-level electoral institutions and laws that had restricted the right to vote prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, despite conflicting legislation advancing racial equality in a number of economic and social contexts. This analysis supports the view that often simple procedural requirements designed to increase transparency can complement broader nondiscrimination mandates and improve equity in enforcement and outcomes, substituting for case-by-case enforcement of standards of nondiscrimination in areas where the use of subjectivity to abridge rights is difficult to identify, and where encouraging comparability across cases and courts enables the adjudication of claims of discrimination in the appeals process at both the state and Federal level.
Differences in the timing of changes in state laws governing the compilation of lists of eligible jurors, documented in this paper, are used to attempt to welfare implications for a much broader set of defendants, both those who face a jury trial and many whose cases are decided through plea bargains or dismissals. Uncertainty at later stages in case processing and adjudication affect choices at earlier stages by changing the incentives for investment in acquiring knowledge or making costly judgments. Even in the presence of career concerns and intrinsic motivation for experts such as judges, prosecutors and others in law enforcement, decisions may be less than optimal.
4 More recently, the use of other characteristics, such as genetic markers that may be correlated with race, has been prohibited by subsequent legislation, such as the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), which applies to employment law. For more information, see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/genetic.cfm.
identify the impact of increasing the share of non-white jurors on outcomes for nonwhites relative to whites in the criminal justice system. Prior to these changes, jury commissioners, town leaders or civilian jury committees could exercise a great deal of discretion in compiling master lists of eligible jurors.
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In principle, discretionary systems were meant to facilitate the construction of "blue-ribbon juries" comprised of "men of recognized intelligence and probity" (Abramson, 2000) . In practice, these systems also facilitated the near total exclusion of African-Americans and other minorities from jury service in some counties, particularly in the U.S. South and prior to the Civil Rights movement (Kennedy, 1998) . After these changes, referred to in some states as Uniform Jury Selection and Service Acts, master lists were required to be selected at random from publicly available lists such as lists of registered voters and drivers or tax and welfare rolls.
The benchmark specification estimates a difference-in-differences specification exploiting variation in timing of the adoption of random selection across states that changed their laws between 1975 and 1999 to test for an effect of changes in the composition of lists of eligible jurors on the nonwhite share of total new admissions to prison. The procedural changes appear to have lowered the nonwhite share of admissions to prison by over 5 percentage points, taking into account national trends and fixed differences across states, a finding that is robust to the inclusion of a rich set of controls. An analysis of the dynamic effects of these law changes reveals a time pattern of treatment effects consistent with a causal interpretation -there are no significant differences in the nonwhite share of admissions to prison in the years leading up to the law changes, and a statistically and economically significant reduction in the year of and immediately following.
Taken together, these findings suggest that increasing opportunities for minorities to participate in jury service led to a substantial decline in the nonwhite share of admissions to prison, relative to both the nonwhite share of arrests and population, consistent with an own-race bias due to differences in either preferences or information. This effect is larger and more robust for nonviolent crimes, suggesting substitution to softer types of enforcement. Given the roughly 500,000 new admissions to prison we observe in these data in 2000, the implied decline of 5-6 percentage points in the nonwhite share of new admissions to prison could reflect changes in convictions and imprisonment for at minimum, roughly 25,000 to 30,000 defendants per year, with significant welfare implications for policy. Similar methods applied to the death penalty data studied in Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) and revisited in Donohue and Wolfers (2005) suggest that these procedural reforms also had strong effects on rates of exercise of the death penalty in capital cases, potentially reflecting related changes in the ability to challenge death penalty sentences in cases originating in lower courts.
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There are several empirical challenges in evaluating the impact of these legislative mandates. First, there are limited outcome data available over a sufficiently long time series, and those data that are available are clearly incomplete. Due to the limited availability of data on conviction rates conditional on going to jury trial, by state and race, and due to the presence of excess variation in levels that may reflect nonreporting, the analysis focuses on the effect of these laws on the nonwhite share of new admissions to prison.
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Although this measure of admissions to prison includes admissions resulting from all convictions, rather than just those from jury trials, it arguably may still be a relevant outcome, as changes in jury participation may influence the 6 One aspect of the value of procedural reforms that is not discussed in detail in this paper is the extent to which people may value aspects of the judicial system that reinforce norms of fairness and affirm rights to seek equal treatment before the law. Recent research by Wolfers and Stevenson (2010) suggests that self-reported measures of well-being for blacks improved relative to whites during periods when income inequality, black-white test score gaps, and other measures of racial progress did not, suggesting that some of the benefits of the Civil Rights movement and related efforts to address discriminatory beliefs and practices may have been of inherent value or otherwise reflected in these measures of quality of life.
7 To the extent that the data contain measurement error that is classical, the errors in the data collection can result in larger standard errors but not bias the point estimates.
terms of plea bargains or the seriousness of charges even in cases that do not ultimately go to trial.
Second, the timing of these law changes may have been endogenous in the sense that the passage of these laws may have been driven by improvements in the broader racial climate, or they may have been bundled with other important civil rights reforms. I try to address this by assessing the sensitivity of results to including more flexible controls for time trends, by examining the timing of improvements relative to the legislatively mandated procedural changes described above, and by testing for contemporaneous changes in attitudes in the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Studies (ANES). Note that these procedural changes also applied to civil cases. I also present some qualitative evidence that these law changes were not high profile political issues, relative to employment discrimination, the representation of minorities in corporate boardrooms and drug-related sentencing guidelines. There is no evidence that these law changes were coincident with changes in the racial composition of arrests or with changes in racial attitudes in the general population.
One challenge that is difficult to address is to attribute the estimated changes in the demographic composition of admissions to prison to specific shifts in the demographic composition of eligible jurors. Comprehensive data on jury lists and jury participation across states and over time are not available, and the analysis here is conducted under the maintained assumption that these laws lead to an increase in the diversity of jury pools by race, gender, and socioeconomic status, as described in secondary sources (Kennedy, 1998) .
This analysis finds evidence for strong effects of potential jury composition on the racial composition of new admissions to prison, but does not preclude the importance of other criminal justice reforms for potentially narrowing the observed racial gap in incarceration. A significant empirical literature suggests that discrimination may contribute significantly to racial gaps at both earlier and later stages of the criminal process, including both at the stage of arrest ("racial profiling") and at sentencing and appeals, both of which rely heavily on the discretion of judges. Donohue and Levitt (2001) find that increases in the share of black police officers coincide with increases in white arrests and vice versa, while McCrary (2010) finds evidence for modest effects of the imposition of court-ordered hiring quotas on the racial composition of arrests. Anwar and Fang (2006) and Antonovics and Knight (2009) also find evidence for racial biases in police searches. In a recent paper, Abrams, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2010) find evidence for racial biases in sentencing by judges by exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges. A priori, it seems likely that jurors, who face no career or reputational incentives to act in a non-discriminatory manner, may be more prone to discriminate than judges, prosecutors or law enforcement officers. Iyengar (2007) finds evidence that juries may be more racially biased than judges by examining a Supreme Court decision that shifted the authority to impose sentences from judges to juries in capital cases in 13 states. In addition, a large literature in social psychology finds evidence that similarity between juror and defendant characteristics generally leads to a bias in favor of the defendant. However, these studies largely rely on mock jury experiments, qualitative evidence, or small samples of cases which provide a characterization of cross-sectional patterns (Devine et al, 2001) .
These findings relate to the extensive and broader empirical literature on discrimination. Previous work has found evidence for discrimination in a wide range of contexts, including but not limited to labor markets, marriage markets, and sports. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find that resumes randomly assigned to have black names receive 50 percent fewer callbacks than those with white names, while Price and Wolfers (2007) find that NBA referees call more fouls on players of the opposite race, all else equal. Similarly, and with potentially broader applicability, Pager et al. (2009) find that in a field experiment in which matched applicants were randomized on the basis of characteristics other than race and criminal record, black applicants were discriminated against severely, with magnitudes matching those for possessing criminal records among white applicants, providing additional experimental evidence to the growing literature on racial discrimination in the labor market and in other arenas (Fryer et al., 2006) .
To the extent that incarceration has broader social costs, including for children and family members of inmates, racial biases reflected in differential arrest rates, conviction rates, rates of imprisonment, sentence length and time to parole may contribute to observed differences in employment, earnings, and school achievement (Kling, 2006; Pager et al., 2009 ).
This analysis finds that the direct effects of simple procedural changes supporting broader nondiscrimination mandates can be large, in this case approximately half the difference between the unweighted average of nonwhite admissions to prison and nonwhite arrests in the data, or one quarter of the difference between the unweighted average of nonwhite admissions to prison and the nonwhite population share. It also relates to a contentious debate regarding procedural reforms such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which strongly affect case processing and sentencing in federal courts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief outline of jury selection procedures and describes the law changes examined in this paper. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework for understanding the possible effects of this policy change. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes and outlines directions for further work.
Background

Jury Selection Procedures
While jury selection procedures vary from state to state, they share several common features across states. The initial pool of eligible jurors is contained in a master list, typically compiled by jury commissioners and district clerks. Names of potential jurors are drawn from this list, and summonses are mailed to those jurors who are drawn. Summoned prospective jurors appear before a judge, and can be excused due to unnecessary hardship. The remaining potential jurors are assigned at random to jury panels for each trial, and are sent to a "voir dire" to be considered for jury service for a particular trial. In most states, jurors may be examined by defense and prosecution attorneys or by a judge. During this process, they may be dismissed "for cause" due to conflicts of interest or preexisting knowledge of the case, or without cause through peremptory challenges 8 .
This paper focuses on laws which limited the ability of jury commissioners and district clerks to manipulate the composition of the jury pool by excluding women, African Americans and the poor from the master jury list. The decades following the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 also witnessed growing protections against both racial discrimination and racially motivated hate crimes or hate crimes motivated by religion following decisions in federal courts and related changes at lower levels of government, reflecting efforts to address both procedural aspects of case administration and biased attitudes that had previously contributed to racial differences in the adjudication of cases, resulting in differential conviction rates, sentence length and aggregate rates of imprisonment.
Discrimination could occur at each stage of jury selection, and there is at least strong anecdotal evidence that peremptory challenges are used to strike black jurors in cases with black defendants, particularly in capital cases (Liptak, 2007; Baldus et al, 2001) . However, there is some reason to believe that exclusion at stage of compilation of juror lists was significant relative to discrimination at later stages in reducing the representation of nonwhites on juries relative to their population share. A 1972 survey of jury commissioners, district clerks, state attorneys, defense attorneys and judges in 325 counties in the South with large African American populations found that self-reported race shares at different stages (jury list, jury box, jury) indicate that a large fraction of the disparity between population shares and jury service race shares materialized at the stage of the compilation of the jury list (Benokraitis, 1982) .
The number of peremptory challenges available to defense and prosecution attorneys is limited by state law, although the limit varies across states.
9 These survey results should be viewed with caution, given nonresponse rates and biases in self-reported data, although the conclusion that the disparity largely appears at the stage of the jury list may be robust to this if misreporting is similar across jury commissioners, attorneys, and judges.
Changes to Law Determining Juror Eligibility and Summonses
A sweeping procedural change occurred in Federal courts as a result of the passage of the 1968 Jury Selection and Service Act, which required the approximately 60% of districts still allowing discretion in the selection of eligible jurors to switch to random sampling from lists of registered voters (Lindquist, 1967) . While a small number of states adopted random selection before 1968, most states slowly switched over following the passage of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act and a 1975 Supreme Court decision which required state courts to do the same (Abramson, 2000) . As of 1980, sixteen states still retained policies which allowed for discretion in the selection of eligible jurors. As of 2004, only four states allowed for discretion in the summoning of potential jurors (National Center for State Courts, 1980; National Center for State Courts, 2004) . Despite the disproportionately low representation of nonwhites on voter rolls, and the opportunities provided by peremptory challenges to strike nonwhite jurors from juries later in the jury selection process, it seems plausible that the number of nonwhite jurors would be higher under random selection than under the key-man system.
While there were often prohibitions against discriminatory jury selection in state laws, there is some evidence that these laws were difficult to enforce in the absence of specific statutory requirements limiting discretion in procedures such as the compilation of lists of eligible jurors. One legal scholar found that between 1935 and 1975, the Supreme Court heard on average one case per term regarding discriminatory jury selection procedures, and usually ruled in favor of the defendant (Van Dyke, 1977) . The persistence of such cases into the 1970's suggests that discriminatory practices continued even though there was a clear precedent that they would be ruled unconstitutional (Abramson, 2000) .
Even laws mandating the use of specific source lists alone, without supplementary legislative mandates specifying that potential jurors should be selected at random from them, appear to have left substantial room for discretion in the compilation of lists of eligible jurors 10 . In the coding of state laws, I follow the taxonomy in the Bureau of Justice Statistics' "State Court Organization" publications and focus on two aspects of the laws governing compilation of the master list: whether they specify a source list (such as the voter registration list or list of registered drivers), and whether they require random selection from these lists rather than giving a substantial amount of discretion to jury commissioners, clerks, or jury commissions comprised of citizens or civil servants. States are coded as having adopted "random selection" if the laws specify source lists and require random selection from those lists. Data on jury participation are scarce, but Supreme Court cases provide a rich (albeit unrepresentative) source of anecdotal evidence about the impact of key-man jury selection procedures on the composition of the pool of eligible jurors. For example, in 1947, the Court reversed the death sentence of a man who was convicted in Lauderdale County, Mississippi because out of 12,511 African Americans in the county at the time, only 25 were eligible to serve on juries. Even more shockingly, no African American had served on a jury in that county in the previous 30 years (Patton v. Mississippi, 332 US 463) (Abramson, 2000) . In another example, in 1975 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the disparity between the 51 % population share of Quitman County and the 24 % share on the list for trial juries, when added to evidence showing that this disparity appeared only after the stage of the process where discretion could be exercised, provided prima facie evidence of discrimination (Foster v. Sparks, 1975) .
Discussion of the procedures governing compilation of jury lists appears infrequently in the academic literature on discrimination, although they are featured prominently in more recent histories of discrimination and the criminal jury (Kennedy, 1998; Alschuler, 1994) . It also does not appear that these law changes were contemporaneous with the passage of broader state-level civil rights legislation, although they were in some cases bundled with procedural reforms such as the institution of one day-one trial systems of jury service. In reported using personal knowledge to select potential jurors, or consulting acquaintances to eliminate a significant number of jurors from the lists based on reports of "character" and "intelligence". addition, these law changes do not appear to have generated attention in the popular media at the time they were enacted, suggesting that they were not politically salient issues and leaving open the possibility that they do not simply reflect general improvements in race relations that would independently drive changes in the racial composition of crime and admissions to prison.
In addition to this qualitative evidence, in the results section below I present some regressions characterizing contemporaneous trends in attitudes, arrest rates, and regressions which allow for more flexible state trends. These tests provide some confidence that the estimates, which are large relative to the average difference between arrest rates and incarceration rates in these data, are informative.
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3 Theoretical Framework
Model of Jury Discrimination
This section outlines a theoretical framework in which to interpret the impact of increasing the share of black jurors, showing that severe biases can be present even in a context where racial differences in juror preferences are modeled primarily as informational. The model presents two sources of informational differences in preferences: differences in prior beliefs regarding the probability of guilt, and differences in the responsiveness of prior beliefs to new information regarding the possible guilt of defendants, under the assumption that the median defendant entering trial is guilty. We use this formulation for analytical tractability and content, although existing studies of discrimination in other contexts, such as in labor markets, suggests that statistical models of discrimination have little empirical content.
This section also presents and discusses a brief theoretical model of the choice to bring a defendant to jury trial, with the welfare effects of changes in jury recruitment procedure in mind.
It is straightforward to show in an alternative framework, based solely on taste-based discrimination, that increasing the share of black jurors would decrease black incarceration rates. While these models generate similar predictions, their welfare implications are quite different. Under the first model, increasing the share of black jurors could merely be redistributive, although under certain circumstances it would be welfare improving. Under the second, increasing the share of black jurors could be strictly welfare-increasing (in the absence of race-specific externalities, etc). We consider the first type of model here, noting that in more complex models of statistical discrimination, even information-based discrimination can lead to multiple equilibria with presumably different welfare implications across groups (Fryer, 2007) .
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Suppose that all jurors do prefer to get it right, and minimize expected squared error loss given the information they have:
where a ∈ {0, 1} is equal to 1 if the jury convicts, Ω denotes the set of information the jury has, and I is an indicator equal to 1 if the defendant is truly guilty.
If the action were continuous, setting a to the posterior mean of I would be the optimal action. Since a is discrete, this translates to a cutoff rule where:
reflects all of the information that the jury has about the defendant's guilt, including their prior beliefs (prior signals), and the signals they receive during the course of the trial. Suppose that black and white jurors have the same distribution of prior beliefs about the guilt of a defendant, and suppose that this distribution is normal with mean θ 0 > 1 2 and variance σ 2 0 . This means that with no additional information, the jury will convict.
The assumption that black jurors receive better quality information (or can extract more precise signals from the information they receive) is modeled by assuming that black jurors receive signals with lower variance than white jurors:
Given an innocent defendant, because signals are weighted by ratio of variance to sum of variances, posterior beliefs are "more guilty" when there are more whites on the jury, because beliefs are shifted less by noisier signals.
The posterior beliefs of the jury as a whole are given by:
where θ s is the mean of the signals, and σ 2 s = i σ 2 i is the variance of θ s . Note that if there are n b nonwhite jurors of N total jurors, the posterior beliefs of the jury can be rewritten as:
If θ s < θ 0 , as will be the case on average if the defendant is innocent, then
Differences in the prior means by race can reverse this counterintuitive prediction, suggesting that initial biases may be important relative to withintrial differences in the way that jurors respond to evidence and information. To the extent to which bargaining weights enter similarly to differences in the precision of beliefs, this also suggests that straightforward coalitional bargaining models with homogeneous agents within types would not match the data. Adding a requirement of unanimity does not change this, suggesting that ex ante indicators of bias such as race, income, and observable choices such as living in integrated neighborhoods and choosing integrated workplaces are likely to be predictive of trial outcomes.
Plea Bargaining
The effect of random sampling on the nonwhite share of admissions to prison could then be to lower the nonwhite share of admissions to prison through two channels: through a direct impact on conviction probabilities conditional on reaching trial, and through the effect this change in conviction probability may have on the treatment of cases at earlier stages in the process. Given that a small share of cases actually go to trial, it would perhaps be surprising to observe a quantitatively significant effect of changes in jury selection procedures on rates of admission to prison without considering the indirect effect that changes in these procedures may have at earlier stages, for example by changing the threat points for negotiations between defense attorneys and prosecutors over the terms of plea bargains.
To illustrate these two effects, consider a toy model in which the prosecutor's objective is to maximize expected punishment possible given three possible outcomes: acquittal, which involves a punishment of 0; plea bargain punishment L (which is for now assumed to be exogenously given, and assumed to be a punishment other than inprisonment); and conviction (resulting in imprisonment) H . Let p be the probability that the jury will convict, and C be the cost to the prosecutor of taking the case to trial with probability distribution F (). The prosecutor will then take a case to trial if p · H − L > c, or with probability F (p · H − L), and the defendant will be sent to prison with probability p · F (p · H − L). The effect of an exogenous shock to p is given by: dP r(imprisoned) dp
Both terms are positive, so a negative shock to p will unambiguously reduce the share of defendants who are imprisoned. The first term captures the direct effect of a change in p on the probability of imprisonment. The second term captures the indirect effect: prosecutors may be more willing to agree to plea bargains if the probability of conviction goes down. This is a crude toy model, and in reality prosecutors could adjust on a number of margins, including the severity of the charge and sentencing, but it captures the basic intuition behind why changes in jury composition may have substantial effects on imprisonment even though a small share of cases go to trial.
Discussion of Welfare Implications
The discussion to this point has taken for granted that random sampling would decrease the probability of conviction for nonwhites, but it is plausible that the effect of moving to random sampling could increase conviction probabilities for nonwhites.
First, some argue that all-white juries convict insufficiently frequently or impose less stringent sentences in cases involving African American defendants and African American victims (Kalven, 1971) . Consistent with this hypothesis, Blume, 2004 finds that black defendants convicted of murdering black victims are underrepresented on death row given the share of black defendant-black victim murder cases among all murder cases, and that this shortfall is larger in the South than in the rest of the country. Given that both violent and nonviolent crimes are most often intraracial, introducing more nonwhites into the pool of eligible jurors could then in theory raise the rate of nonwhite admissions to prison.
Second, random sampling could have brought less educated whites as well as more nonwhites into the pool of eligible jurors. These less educated whites could be more biased jurors than the "men of probity" who supposedly served as jurors under the key-man system. Third, to the extent that these changes were mitigated by the use of peremptory challenges to remove nonwhite jurors from jury panels, these results suggest that the inclusion of a small number of nonwhite jurors on a jury panel may heavily influence trial outcomes. This may reflect the fact that jury verdicts in most jurisdictions must be unanimous, so the dissent of a single juror would be sufficient to prevent conviction. Consistent with this, Anwar et. al. (2012) find strong evidence that the inclusion of at least one black juror changes case outcomes relative to all-white juries. Finally, given that only a small share of criminal cases go to jury trials, it may be the case that changes to the pool of jurors would have no effect or a very small effect on admissions to prison, if the effect of a change in the expected conviction rate on upstream decisions such as plea bargaining is small.
Data
The timing of the de jure changes were obtained from each state's annotated state code. The year in which each state changed its policy (to the best of my knowledge), as well as a list of states that never changed their policies appear are summarized in Table 1 and documented in more detail in Appendix A. The date of the law change was inferred from five cross sections from secondary sources that document the laws governing source list compilation in 1977, 1980, 1993, 1998 and 2004 13 ; from notes to the relevant codes in current and superseded versions of the annotated state code for each state; and from state-specific secondary sources in some cases. States which adopted random selection from public source lists in 1975 or before are coded as having changed "before 1975" and are included in the regressions as controls, as are states that never changed their procedures. , 1926-1986" for 1975-1985 .
The National Corrections Reporting Program datasets contain individual level information on admissions to prison, including a limited set of demographic characteristics (age, sex, race, and education), the most serious charge, the maximum time to be served, whether the individual is being newly committed to prison, and the county in which the sentence was imposed. For this analysis, I aggregate these data up to state-year cells. Since race for nonwhites was only coded as "nonwhite" or "other" in some years, I code all admissions data in that fashion, rather than focusing on African American admissions to prison.
The NCRP data begin in 1983, and data quality is especially poor for the first few years. Although the best available, both series are flawed, with missing observations for many state-year pairs and obviously incorrect data (potentially due to nonreporting) in others. The analysis excludes data from Alaska, Hawaii, Connecticut and Louisiana due to very poor data quality 14 . State-year pairs with fewer than 100 new admissions to prison were dropped from the analysis as well. Even after dropping these obviously flawed state-year observations, there is a large amount of year to year variation in the numbers of admissions to prison that does not appear to reflect real variation. This analysis thus focuses on the nonwhite share of admissions to prison rather than the absolute numbers of prisoners admitted or number of prisoners admitted per popula-tion. Given the questionable data quality, the findings in this paper should be interpreted with some caution (although if the measurement error in the outcome variable is classical, this should result in larger standard errors but not bias the estimates). Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis appear in Table 2 . Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) on arrests by race were obtained for 1980-1999 through the National Consortium on Violence Research.
The uneven coverage across states and over time reduces the number of law changes that can be used to identify the treatment effect from 12 to 7 in the specification without controls, and to only two states in the specification with the most comprehensive set of controls.
Results
Estimates using the variation in timing of laws mandating random selection suggest that the institution of statutory requirements that lists of eligible jurors be selected at random led to a 5 to 6 percentage point drop in the nonwhite share of admissions. Pooling the data, a weighted least squares estimate of the difference-in-differences specification shows that rates of admission to prison for non-whites were lower in years following the passage of such laws, and that this finding is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a rich set of controls (Table III, where the standard set of controls include an indicator that is equal to 1 if the outcome data are not from the NCRP, the nonwhite population share, the log of the state population in thousands, the log of the number of prisons per capita lagged one year, whether or not the state has a non-discretionary concealed handgun law, the log of state income per capita in $2000, the log of police per capita lagged one year, the unemployment rate, beer consumption in gallons per capita, the poverty rate, AFDC generosity lagged 15 years, and the nonwhite share of arrests.
For the benchmark specification including state and year effects the full set of controls (column IV of Table 3 ), this finding is robust to controlling for time trends more flexibly by adding linear state-specific trends or regionyear fixed effects (Appendix Table D) , with estimates of similar magnitude and significance in specifications accounting for the strong regional aspect of the composition of group of late changers apparent in Table 1 . This provides confidence that the estimated treatment effect does not reflect differences in trends in adopting and nonadopting states, any differences in unobserved factors that trend linearly over time with states, or region-specific time varying unobserved factors. The estimate is stable across specifications. The estimate is also robust to weighting by state population and qualitatively robust to being estimated with OLS (Appendix Table E ).
Given the roughly 500,000 new admissions to prison we observe in these data in 2000, the implied decline of 5-6 percentage points in the nonwhite share of new admissions to prison reflects changes in convictions and sentencing for at minimum, roughly 25,000 to 50,000 defendants per year.
16
One unusual feature of the set of law changes I am able to analyze with these data is that a large number of states were treated shortly before the beginning of the dataset. If the treatment effect increases over time -for 16 Assuming an average sentence length of 4.5 years, and using the adjusted wage estimates for incarcerated black men between 22 and 30 from Western and Pettit (2005) , and assuming that the changes in race shares reflect changes at the extensive margin for African Americans, a rough counterfactual estimate of the welfare costs of prior discriminatory practices would be about $1.7 billion per year in 2000, small relative to annual expenditures on major social welfare programs such as Medicaid (less than one percent), but large relative to many state budgets, not including matching Federal funding.
example, because imprisonment may increase the returns to future criminal activity or decrease the returns to licit economic activity -then β, the decrease relative to the average trend for the largely already treated "control" states, will underestimate the true treatment effect.
Further evidence that this estimate can be interpreted as causal is provided by examining the timing of the effect. I estimate coefficients on leads and lags of the policy change to trace out the effect of the change over time:
where P reRandomSelection k it is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for observations that are k years preceding the passage of a random selection law, and P ostRandomSelection k it takes on a value of 1 for observations that are k years following the passage of a random selection law. Figure 1 shows that there is no difference in the years leading up to the law change, but a significant decline in the nonwhite share of new admissions in the years immediately following the law change. I cannot reject the hypothesis that the leads of the law changes are jointly equal to zero (p-value = 0.32), but can reject the hypothesis that each of the lags is individually equal to zero at the 10 percent level, and the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to 0 at the 1 percent level (p-value = 0.002).
The move to random selection likely resulted in more diverse jury pools on a number of dimensions including but not limited to race, such as gender, education and income. In order to test whether the observed treatment effect can be attributed to changes in the racial composition of juries rather than to these other changes, I estimate a differences-in-differences-in-differences specification which exploits the fact that the effect of the policy change should have been greater in states with a higher share of non-whites. Suppose that in every state, prior to random sampling, a very small number of non-whites would have served on juries. Random sampling would have produced a greater change in the composition of juries in those states in which African Americans comprise a larger share of the population.
The differences-in-differences-in-differences specification takes the form:
(Table V, columns I through IV) and N onwhiteadmissions it T otaladmissions it = α + β * RandomSelection it +γ * RandomSelection it * N onwhiteP opulationShare it +µ * RandomSelection it * N onwhiteP opulationShare
where in the second set of specifications, the controls include the square of the nonwhite population share (Table V, columns V through VIII). γ and µ are the coefficients of interest. Table V shows that states with larger non-white populations experienced larger declines of non-white admission rates to prison relative to whites than those with smaller non-white populations as a result of the switch from the keyman system to random selection, although γ is only statistically significantly different from 0 in the specifications including the quadratic term. The magnitudes suggest that the effects were substantially larger in states with larger nonwhite population shares. The negative coefficient on the quadratic suggests a declining marginal impact in the nonwhite population share. These features should be interpreted with some caution, because of the small number of law changes involved.
This additional interaction clarifies the interpretation of the difference-indifference results. It is clear that if nonwhite jurors were prone to convict nonwhites at a higher rate than whites in order to better enforce the law in their communities, then states with larger shares of nonwhites should have experienced increases or smaller drops in admissions to prison. In light of this result, we can rule out that story in favor of one in which juries with more whites result in higher rates of admissions to prison for nonwhites -these results can be interpreted as evidence for some type of discrimination by race.
To shed light on the relative importance of the direct effect on conviction probabilities and the indirect effect through the induced changes at stages preceding trial, I test separately for an effect of the law changes on rates of admissions for nonviolent and violent crime (Table VI) . Individuals are classified as having been admitted for a nonviolent or violent crime on the basis of the most serious charge for which they were admitted.
The total decline in the nonwhite share of admissions should reflect both the direct effect of the change in procedure on the conviction probability conditional on going to trial, and the indirect effect induced by this on plea bargaining and other aspects of case processing at earlier stages of the process. A larger share of violent crime cases go to jury trial, so assuming a common effect of changing racial composition on conviction probability for the two categories of crimes, the treatment effect should be larger for violent than nonviolent crimes if the direct effect dominates. However, admissions to prison for nonviolent offenses may be more elastic to changes in conviction probabilities if alternative punishments such as parole are viewed by prosecutors as better substitutes for imprisonment in cases involving nonviolent offenses than for those involving violent offenses. The estimated effect is larger and more statistically significant for nonviolent offenses, suggesting that a substantial portion of the reduction in the nonwhite share of admissions to prison may reflect the strategic response of prosecutors following a decline in the conviction probability.
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Although I do not directly observe plea bargaining here, Kuziemko (2006) finds evidence for an analogous effect on plea bargaining following the 1998 reinstitution of capital punishment in New York state using case-level data. She finds evidence that the ability to pursue a death sentence led to a 3 percentage point jump in the probability that a murder defendant would plead guilty, a 26 percent increase relative to baseline, as well as a 4 percentage point drop in the probability that a murder defendant would be offered a charge bargain. These are large effects given that death notices were issued in fewer than 8 percent of first degree murder cases. Her work suggests that changes in the expected severity of punishment can substantially affect plea bargaining; it seems reasonable to believe that changes in the expected probability of conviction in a jury trial would do the same.
While these estimates are an improvement over the existing literature, this analysis is subject to the usual critiques of panel data analyses that exploit variation in states' policies. The most difficult critique to address is that the timing of the states' policy changes may be endogenous to the outcome of interest. If the factors that determine states' policies are additive and constant over time, then including state fixed effects removes the endogeneity problem. The addition of more flexible controls for time trends can absorb any unobserved differences that may create differential trends in states that change their policies relative to those who do not. However, if the unobserved factors change contemporaneously with the laws -if for example, the law changes were caused by improvements in attitudes towards nonwhites, or if states changed their policies anticipating a future decrease in the probability of guilt conditional on arrest for non-whites relative to whites -then the panel estimates will be biased (Besley, 2000) .
I test whether there were contemporaneous improvements in attitudes towards nonwhites using data from the American National Election Studies. The ANES surveys have been administered nationally every two years since 1948, and in addition to questions about voter participation and politics, includes questions on issues such as race. The set of questions varies over time. Between 1976 and 1994 , the ANES asked whether respondents thought that the government should enforce school integration. Between 1986 and 1998, the ANES asked respondents whether they were for affirmative action in hiring and promotion, whether they thought that blacks "had gotten less than they deserved", and whether they thought that blacks should get "no special favors". These questions do not capture the aspects of attitudes towards nonwhites that would be most relevant for their treatment in court, especially those that focus on the role of government in ameliorating racial differences, but they are likely to be capture some information about prevailing attitudes about race relations
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Using a difference-in-difference specification including state and year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the state level, I test whether these measures of racial attitudes changed discontinuously at the time of the passage of laws mandating random selection:
where here i indexes the individual in state j and survey year t, and the controls include race, gender, dummies for five income categories, age, and 18 The ANES includes questions about the racial composition of coworkers, neighborhoods and friends, but unfortunately these questions were discontinued prior to the period studied in this paper. The variables are coded on a coarse scale, with the outcomes examined in Table VII-A coded as follows: Outcomes in column I are equal to 1 if the respondent thinks the government should ensure school integration, and 0 if the respondent disagrees . Outcomes in column II are equal to 1 if the respondent is for affirmative action in hiring and promotion and 0 if the respondent disagrees. The outcomes in columns III and IV are coded on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates Agree Strongly, 2 indicates Agree Somewhat,3 indicates Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 indicates Disagree Somewhat, and 5 indicates Disagree Strongly. The questions in columns III and IV ask whether minorities have gotten less than deserved, and whether respondents believe minorities should receive no special favors, indicators of support for affirmative action. age squared. There is no evidence that these indicators moved in a direction favorable to nonwhites at the time of the law changes, and some evidence that they deteriorated relative to the rest of the country at those times (Table  VII. A). These results should be regarded as only suggestive, since the ANES sample sizes in any given year are small and the survey is not designed to be representative at the state level.
Using the same specification, I test for contemporaneous changes in attitudes in a number of indicators of racial attitudes from geocoded historical data collected by the GSS (Table VII .B), examining indicators of attitudes towards interracial marriage, socialization across racial boundaries, attitudes towards racial progress, views of segregation, attitudes towards residential integration, and attitudes towards school integration through busing. These also provide no strong evidence that racial attitudes could drive both the observed changes in the racial composition of admissions to prison and the law changes, and although there are marginally significant correlations between adopting the policies of juror summonses studied above and measures of social integration, these effects are small.
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In addition, I perform a similar analysis using the nonwhite arrest share as the outcome variable and find no evidence for an effect of these random selection laws on the nonwhite arrest share (Table VIII) . To the extent that the nonwhite arrest share may be correlated with attitudes among police officers towards nonwhites or changes in the racial composition of the police force, this suggests that the estimated effect was not driven by changes in attitudes towards nonwhites at other points in the justice system.
As an additional rough check for the endogeneity of changes in state laws, I generate an indicator for "early adopter" that is equal to 1 if the state changed its policy by 1975. I then regress (linear probability model) this on various 1975 state characteristics, including income per capita, the share of the state population that is nonwhite, arrests per 1000 population, police per 1000 population, total population, and AFDC generosity. These are shown in Table IX 20 .
A similar analysis provides evidence that these procedural reforms, which likely affected the representativeness of jury pools by age, gender, political affiliation, and socioeconomic status, changed outcomes for a broader set of defendants in capital cases. Table X shows difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of these law changes on the rate of exercise of the death penalty by state and year:
These estimates suggest that the death penalty was exercised less frequently following these procedural reforms, perhaps reflecting the ability to challenge prior convictions and sentences on constitutional grounds, and argue for stays of execution and commutations, or lesser sentences, in addition to clemency or pardons 21 . Similar regressions suggest that these procedural changes did not lead to increases in serious violent crimes such as murders, although changes in the deterrent effect associated with the death penalty could appear over much longer time horizons. If anything, this analysis suggests that these law changes were coincident with a decrease in the murder rate (results not reported, weighted least squares estimates). Taken together, these results provide strong support for the view that procedural requirements which support broader mandates for representativeness and affirm the right to fair treatment in the judicial system have a significant impact on case outcomes and welfare, including for death penalty cases, for which inaccurate convictions arguably impose the greatest social cost.
Conclusion and Interpretation
In this analysis, changing procedures determining juror eligibility and summonses to a process in which eligible jurors were chosen randomly from publicly available lists resulted in substantially fewer nonwhite admissions to prison in states adopting these procedural changes.
The analysis presented here also finds evidence that this effect was contemporaneous with the passage of these law changes or followed one to two years after law changes were enacted, and likely causal; was somewhat more pronounced in states with larger nonwhite populations; and was not contemporaneous with other changes in judicial institutions or racial attitudes, as far as our data reveal. Effects are larger for admissions to prison based on nonviolent offenses than for those based on violent offenses, and additionally effects appear on the exercise of the death penalty. This finding represents a significant contribution to the literature on discrimination, finding substantial effects of changes in administrative procedures on the large average difference between the racial composition of the general population, the racial composition of arrests, and the racial composition of new admissions to prison, consistent with the existence of severe discrimination in the deliberation of criminal cases. This finding is novel in that it focuses on aggregate differences in incarceration rates.
A limitation of the results is that they do not distinguish between theories of discrimination, and as framed have unclear implications for overall welfare, although intuitively and as modeled, these results suggest a welfare gain from more accurate adjudication by jurors in cases involving minority defendants. Discriminatory preferences could produce an elasticity of non-white convictions with respect to the composition of the pool of eligible jurors. In this case, an intervention to achieve the best outcomes by providing for diverse participation in jury service may be warranted (alternative policy recommendations include more limits on the use of peremptory challenges, which allows defense or prosecution lawyers to dismiss jurors without cause). The socially optimal conviction rate could be a function of parameters that differ across racial groups, such as the elasticity of crime with respect to deterrents, or the probability of guilt conditional on arrest. In this case it is unclear from observing an elasticity whether the share of nonwhite jurors should be increased or decreased.
However, in spite of these limitations, the empirical evidence presented in this paper can speak to two broad areas of policy debate. First, they demonstrate that discrimination may contribute in a quantitatively significant way to the observed aggregate differences in incarceration rates for blacks and whites. While much previous research has focused on the role of race in capital cases, these account for an very small share of the total case load and observations made about capital crimes may not generalize to cases involving less serious crimes if high profile or highly emotionally charged cases involving murders inspire more biased decisionmaking than would occur in lower profile cases, or if race is seen as more salient in these types of cases than in those involving less serious offenses.
The evidence shows that these efforts to improve the representativeness of jury pools in lower level courts had effects on imprisonment by race, and appear to have had effects on the exercise of the death penalty in capital cases in general, reducing the rate of exercise of the death penalty overall. Second, this analysis suggests that policies that allow for discretion at various stages of case processing may have important distributional implications and may involve predictable biases 22 , which should be taken into account as well as overall social welfare considerations when policies allowing for discretion are implemented, especially when motivated by the desire to remediate recognizable injustices in the legal system or society. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total admissions to prison in each state-year cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total admissions to prison in each state-year cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total admissions to prison in each state-year cell. Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Data are from Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) . Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by population in each state-year cell.
